Abstract: We examine ethnic Danisha nd ethnic minority Muslim (n =1 5) responses to the negative media frame they experience, and their efforts¹ to build viable dual identities -ways of being Danisha nd Muslim. The reported media negativity is triangulated with evidence from ECRI media reports,p ublic opinion surveys,a nd reports on government policies and institutions. We find that interviewees' experiences vary with theirv isibilitya sM uslims, so hijab wearingw omen and meno fc olour reportm ost negativity in public environments. We alsof ind thate ffortst op ro-activelyp roject ap ositive social media imageo fI slam vary by time since conversion, graduallydeclining.D anishM uslim challenges in forming dual identities are compared with thoseo fS wedish (Malmö) and British (London) Muslims. We examine whyL ondon Muslims more readilyc onstruct dual identities than Malmö Muslims -despite greater negativity in national surveys and barriers to voting.The implications for cultural conflict in Scandinavia are discussed.
tion exacerbated al ack of representation of, and hence 'voice' for,M uslims in public media (ECRI2 012,2 8). Furthermore, the situation is alsol ongstanding. Thus, as earlya si ts second report on Denmark (2001) ECRI expressed concern about the climate surroundingM uslim and Islam in Denmark (2006,2 5) .
By the time of third report,2 006,i nt he wake of the Muhammad cartoons controversy (2005) , this concern had grown, to the extent that ECRI was expressing 'deep concern that the situation concerning Muslims in Denmark has worsened since its second report ' (ibid.) . In the fourth report (2012)t hese concerns persist,e videnced by accounts of bias in reporting of criminalc ases: 'some media report the ethnic background of asuspected criminal when this is not necessary for understandingt he information, but that criminalo ffences committed by Danes against groups of concern to ECRI are underplayed ' (ibid. 28) , and by a continuingl ack of opportunities for minorities to express their views in the media.
Judging by these reports,there is clearlyanegative media climate for Muslims in Denmark; this is not to sayt he media is exclusively negative towards Muslims or that all sections of the media are negative,but thatnegativity is sufficientlyprevalent to be of concern for human rights groups,and part of the everydayexperience of our interviewees (see also Jacobsen et al. 2013) . How,then, do Danish Muslims experience this hostile media frame, and how do they cope with it?Inparticular,given the capacity of social media to enable 'media contraflow' (Cottle 2006) , whereby individuals and groups can respond to stigmatization by developing their ownc ounter-representations and counter-narratives, how far and in what ways do Danish Muslims engagei ns uch practices?A nd, in terms of the work of self-presentation (Goffman 1959) needed to maintain group-a nd self-esteem in the face of stigmatization, how do they represent themselvesa nd construct av iable public identity?I nt his chapter we address these questions using data from interviews with 15 Muslims from mixed ethnic majority and minorityb ackgrounds from the Greater Copenhagen area. We also comment on the conditions which structure the formation and public acceptanceofdual and multiple identities, and on how this might be linked to positive integration outcomes.
Context: Public Attitudes, Culture, and Public Institutions
In mediated societies -societies wheremedia institutions have adominant roleand most, if not all, of our information aboutwhat'sgoingbeyond our immediatelocality comes from media -it is impossible to separate the recognition individuals getfromeach other and the wayt hat media resources ared istributed. (Couldry 2011, 48) How DanishMuslims experience the negative media frame is likelytobesignificantlyshaped by their interactions with ethnic Danes and by how they are treated by Danishp ublic institutions. There is not necessarilyaperfect fit between dominant mediaf rames and publica ttitudes; audiences are active,b ringing their own experiences and thinkingt ot heiri nterpretation of media representations (Livingstone 2015) . However,a sC ouldry (2011,4 8) points out,o ni ssues wheret he public is largely dependento nt he media for information, media frames are likelyt op layadecisive role. So how widelys hared is the dominant negative media frame in Denmark by the Danish public? Widespread negativity towards immigrants in Denmark in general, and especiallyt owards Muslims, is evident in European Social Survey (ESS, 2014)d ata. Thus, 46 percent of Danes agree with the proposition thatthe government should allow 'few or no Muslims' to come and settle in their country,afinding consistent the YouGov figure of 45 percent of Danes having an egative impression of Muslims (Dahlgren 2015) . Furthermore, 42.3 percent of Danes agree with the proposition that 'immigrantst ake out more than they put in' in terms of taxes and services, suggesting acompetitive framing of the relationship between immigrants and the majority amongst asubstantial section of the population, which is likelyt or einforce societal divisions.
Danes also scorehighlyonmeasures of asense of culturalsuperiority.Thus, 59.9 percent of Danes agree with the proposition that 'some cultures are much better than others' (ESS 2014,s econd onlyt oN orwegians, at 64.4 percent), an attitude which might provide fertile ground for forms of 'culturalr acism' (Blaut 1992) ,and provide weak foundationsfor practiceswhich value the contribution to society of culturallyd ifferent others. Furthermore,2 9.8p ercent of Danes agree with the statement that 'having alaw against ethnicdiscrimination in the workplace is bad for the country',the highest in Europe, with thosec onsidering having such alaw as 'extremelybad' in Denmark (12 percent) more than twice thato ft he second placed country (Switzerland, 5.9p ercent). Such strong public rejection of anti-discrimination laws mayi mpact on Muslim minorities if they seek to challengew orkplace discrimination, and contributet oaclimate whereM uslims feelu nwelcome.
Of course, opinions expressed confidentiallyi ns urveys do not necessarily translate into publiclye xpressed attitudes or behaviour.H owever,t he CoMRel survey (see Chapter 2) found that 18.2 percent of the Danesa gree that 'hostile attitudes towards foreigners should be tolerated',suggesting that public expression of xenophobic views is acceptable for as ignificant minority. Further evidence suggests that the challenging public environment extends to Danishg overnment policies and public institutions. Thus, researchers have argued that government policydiscourse has contributed to reinforcing abinary division between 'Muslims' and 'Danes' by de-legitimizingc onservative Muslims voices through an overlyb road official discourse on radicalization (Kühle and Lindekilde 2012) . In this process Muslims who hold conservative views on gender and sexuality,w hich overlap with those of some in the majority population and had been previouslyc onsidered part of legitimate difference in values, are grouped together with extremists.
Barrierst oi nclusion in publici nstitutions are caused not justb yovert hostility,b ut produceda lso as an unintended consequenceo fs tronglym arked differencea rising from ah istory of relative homogeneity.A sN ielsen comments in his introduction to Islam in Denmark:The Challenge of Diversity,ifone is not Lutheran or of Lutheran heritaget hen:
in the Danish context,t he institutional structures ares uch, however,t hat it is difficultt o avoid beingreminded that one is somehow different.Although one of the most secular societies in Europe, Danish society and institutions arethoroughly impregnated with Lutheran Christianity. Normallyl ess than 3p ercento ft he population is in church on Sundays … Nielsen describes Danish Muslims as caught in the crossfireb etween 'an ationalist populism with right-wing tendencies and amoreoutward-lookingspectrum of pluralist and cosmopolitan perspectives',which results in 'acontinuous challengef or Muslims -and others, but especiallyn on-Christians -to takea dvantageofthe freedom of assemblyand organization guaranteed by the Danishconstitution' (Nielsen 2012,4) .
We interviewed Muslims from Copenhagen, the largest and most diverse city in Denmark. Although it is not necessarilythe case, arangeofevidence suggests that minorities in large cities often take the lead in developing new institutions and identities which help to establish asense of belonginginsociety,which then spread to groups in other parts of the country.One of the reasons for this is the diversity of minoritycommunities in large cities; whereas in small cities minority religious communities might be dominated by as ingle ethnic group, this is less likelyinlarge cities, meaning that if groups are to createinstitutions basedona shared religious identity,they need to cooperate on multi-ethnic lines. In Copen-hagen, there is evidence of this; for example, the Grand Mosque in Copenhagen (Hamad Bin Khalifa CivilisationCentre), opened in 2014,and the feminist oriented Women'sMosque, which opened in August 2016,are bothorganized on multiethnic lines (The Local.dk 2016) . Reciprocally, the public authorities in large cities often also take the lead in recognizingdiversity and developing practices and policies which enable migrant integration (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) . And, as shown in Chapter 9, anti-immigrant sentiment tends to be lower in large cities. Givent hese conditions,o ne might expectM uslims in Copenhagen to be at the forefront of developing strategies to negotiate the hostile nationalm edia frame.
Sampling,S ample, andM ethod
This chapter drawso nq ualitative interviews with 15 Muslims from the Greater Copenhagen area in Denmark. Five were Muslims from ethnic minorityb ackgrounds,while ten weree thnic Danes who had converted to Islam,f or periods of between six months and 15 years before the interview.Wec hose to interview both groups because we hypothesized each mayn egotiate the media frame and handle identity challenges in different ways.Previous research had located converts on apronounced fault line in Danishsociety,whereamarked boundary between 'Danes' and 'Muslims' is perceivedtoexist (Jensen 2008, 390) . Indeed, in a striking passageJ ensen describes converts as having 'become … members of the immigrant minority' in the eyes of ethnic Danes (ibid.), suggesting aremarkable processo fe thnicization worthyo ff urther study. Straddling such ab oundary, converts might provide unique insights into ways of negotiating the hostile media frame. Conversely, because of theirv isibilityand 'double otherness' (ethnicallya nd religiously other),a nd potential to draw on ar angeo f( including media) resourcesf rom transnationaln etworks, ethnic minorities also promise to provide distinctive insights.
Among the converts, six weref emales and four males. Their ages ranged from 18 to 42 years, with three of the males being in their forties, the other 21. Among the females, one was1 8, the others in their twenties -between 21 and 29.T he threeo lder males all converted to Islam near the millennium, one in year 2000 and two in 2002 -shortlya fter 9/11. One female converted in 2007, while the others had converted within the past four years. Among the ethnic Muslims, one is femalea nd four are males. The female was 29 years old, while the ageo ft he males ranged from 19 to 29.A ll five ethnicM uslims were born in Denmark, but have diverse familyb ackgrounds from Turkey,P akistan, Palestine, and Lebanon.
Interviewees werec hosen because of their active media engagement -such as in local newspapers,a nd on Facebook and Instagram -wheret hey deal in different ways with the negative media frame in Denmark in relation to Muslims and Islam. Through these media practicest hey publiclye ngagei nd iscussions and debates about Islam and Muslims, or in other ways displayt heir Muslim identity,e .g.b yp osting pictures of theirh ijabs and/or quotations from the Quran and Muslim teachers or philosophers on Facebook and Instagram.
The studyu sed semi-structuredi nterviews, conducted between August 2015 and March 2016.After initial questions about name,age,and date of conversion (whereapplicable), all respondents were asked the same four main questions: 1) how do youview the Danish media, especiallythe representation of Muslims and Islam?2)w hat social media do youuse? 3) how do youuse social media?4 )d o youthink that the ways in which Islam and Muslims are presented in the Danish media has anyi mpact on your life and/or on how youb ehave in public?T hese main questions weref ollowed by several 'follow up' questions, e. g. about the strategies the interviewees adopted in relation to the negative media frame in Denmark.
In the following sections, the responses will be analysed around two themes. First,h ow Muslims from different backgrounds attempt to construct av iable identity in ah ostilem edia environment,a nd second, the usesa nd forms of self-representation developed, both in person and using social media.
Discussion: 'In-Betweens':T he Strugglet o Construct Viable Identities
Based on our data, we can initiallys tate that being aM uslim in Denmark -regardless of ethnic origin -is to ahighdegreetobeethnicallymarked. Or in other words: youare considered (and consider yourself to be) part of an ethnic minority when youare or,more strikingly,become aMuslim. Such is the binary distinction prevalentbetween being Muslim and being Danish experiencedbyour convert interviewees, and attested in previous studies (Jensen 2008) , thatbecoming Muslim trumpsbeing ethnicallyDanish;asone of our interviewees,Henrik² (see further below), puts it, 'Henrik … used to be Danish -or still is Danish -but in culturalterms is not Danishanymore because he is Muslim.' (Henrik, 40-year-old male convert,Copenhagen).
 Subjects' names have been changedt op rotect their anonymity. This is very different to the findingso fs tudies in some otherl ocations. For example, Alyedreessey (2016) interviewed 36 converts contacted via central London mosques, and while most reported considerable tensions with their families and other difficulties (indeed aq uarter gave up their Islamic faith), none expressed this in terms of ac hangeo fe thnicity.W es hall return to this puzzling contrast in the conclusion.
Further,w ec an initiallys tate that all respondents have basicallya ccepted the social fact of the mutuale xclusiveness of Danish and Muslim identities as astarting point,eventhough they continued to struggle to overcome it.The visible Muslims (marked either by dress,s elf-presentation, or skin colour)e xperienced manytensions in this regard, mainlydue to resistancefrom their own families and friends and/or duet ot he conflictual public environment towards Muslims in Denmark. In this section, we will consider how this ethnic minority status affects our respondents' identity construction.
The 'InvisibleM uslims'
To construct aviable dual (Muslim and Danish) identity in a 'hostile' or 'conflictual' public environment and to negotiate the tensions between these identities is, for most of our respondents, an ongoing struggle. First,wea ddress thoser espondents( white, male) whose Muslim identity was not publiclya pparent to ethnic Danes (either through clothes or skin tone), hence 'invisible' Muslims. Of these, onlyo ne did not feel conflicted in his identity:21-year-old Brian from Copenhagen.
In April 2009,atthe ageof16, Brian converted to Islam,and as he stated, he has never looked back since. Prior to his conversion³ to Islam,B rian was, in his own words, 'awild youngm an',whose primary focus and favourite activity was to 'party and chase ladies'.Atsome point duringhis 16th year,hegot tired of this lifestyle, and began to search for 'something'-he did not know what he was searchingf or,o nlyt hath ew anted and needed 'something new to fill out my life with'.D uring this process Brian began to chat with am ale convert to Islam from his neighbourhood. Every Fridaythe neighbour went to FridayPrayer in alocal Mosque and after acouple of weeks,Brian decided to visit the Mosque. Since that day, Brian has considered himself aMuslim. He began to studyIslam  Most of our interviewees preferred the term 'reversion' to 'conversion',because the former implies areturn to Islam understood as the original faith of all humanity,and hencebetterfits their theological view.Weu se 'conversion' for ease of understanding.
daily -and still does. He began to pray five timesevery day, he stopped drinking and chasing ladies, he stopped eating pork, and lastly, he changed his name.For Brian, there is no 'middle way':either he is aMuslim, with all that it entails, or he is not.Therefore, Brian claims that he does not experience tensions in negotiating between aM uslim and aD anish identity -simplyb ecause he has, in his words, erased his Danishi dentity,s ymbolized by his changeo fn ame:
When Ic onvertedIwas like … the identity that Ih ad before, Il eft it behind me. Because when youa re convincedo fs omething, youc annot onlyc ommit to half of if -that is, if youa re convinced that this is the right thingf or you. Then youh avet oe mbrace it. As mentioned in the previous section, the three male converts in their forties all converted to Islam at the beginning of this century,one in year 2000 and two in 2002,t hat is, shortlya fter the September 11 attacks on the US.L ikewise, all three male converts in their forties tell thatt hey,d uring the first eight to ten years after reversion, did not think so much about their 'Muslim-ness' and 'Danish-ness',orrather,their 'Muslim-ness' as opposed to their 'Danish-ness',simply because they very rarely did getc onfronted with their dual identity as problematic. Fore xample, duringo ur interview with Henrik we had al ong talk about how thingsh ad changed for him as aM uslim since he converted to Islam prior to the September 11 attacks on the US.A ccordingt oH enrik, he never thoughta bout his identityd uring his first years as aM uslim -about whether he wasM uslim and/or Dane, because 'of course, Ia mb oth'.H owever,d uring the past five years or so, with politicians, the public, and the media all focusing on the contradictions between Islam and 'Danish-ness',Henrik, as well as Jørgen and John, has been forced to reflect upon his identity in an ew,d ifferent and deeper way. And for all threet his reflection has meant that they all todayc onsider themselvesasbelongingtothe Muslim minorityinDenmark -as belonging to another ethnicity and culture. However,eventhough Henrik does not consider himself Danish in cultural terms anymore, he still considers himself to be a Dane. That is alsot he reason whyh ee xperiences tensions between his Danish and Muslim identity,a nd whyh eo ften tries to show those around him that he is not ad angerous man -just an ormal Danishm an, at least by birth, who also happens to be Muslim. Thus, he expressed aw ish to:
show who youare as aperson, tell the world that Henrik,who used to be Danish -or still is Danish, but in cultural terms is not Danish anymorebecause he is Muslim -is agood person. He is still ahuman being, he still has good values, he does not adheretoISIS or other oppressive worldviews.( Henrik, Danish convert to Islam, 38 years old)
In similar ways,this is also what the twoothermale converts in their forties said duringt he interviews.
VisibleM uslims: Part 1
Our data indicates that it is especially -though not entirely -the visibleM uslims, that is the Muslims from ethnic minoritybackgrounds and the female converts, who all wear the hijab, who experience tensions in relations to theirr eligion and construction of av iable dual identity.O rp ut differently, the data indicatest hat the visibleM uslims face resistancei namore direct wayt han the invisibleM uslims, i. e. the male converts.
UnlikeBrian, Henrik, John and Jørgen, the six femaleethnicallyDanishconverts, the one female minority Muslim, and the four male minority Muslims are visiblyM uslim. All females wear the hijab, and all males are dark-skinned and have dark hair,two have long beards and one wears an Islamic rope and at urban. Besides being highlyaware of their visibility as Muslims, all 11 visible Muslims expressed frustration over not being fullya ccepted as Danes duet ot hem being visibleM uslims. However,t he focus of the concern this causes, among the female converts on the one hand and the Muslims from ethnicminoritybackgrounds on the other hand,and the consequences the lack of acceptance has for the two groups,seems to be different.Thus, our data indicates that especiallythe female converts are highlypreoccupied with issues relatedtotheir own familiesto resistancea nd lack of acceptance from theiro wn familym embers and their own belongingi nt heirf amilies -and not with lack of acceptance from society in general. This -lack of acceptance from society in general -waso nt he contrary what most concernedthe minority Muslims. Someexamples can help demonstrate this tendency in our data.
Life in the Spotlight
In 2008, at the ageo f1 5, Sonja converted to Islam, meaning that,when we met Sonja at ac afé in Copenhagen in January 2016,s he had been ap racticing Muslim for eight years. With as mile on her face, Sonja referred to herself as some kind of 'Danish-Muslim closet-feminist'-in this context meaningt hat she silentlyf ights for the rights of otherf emale Muslims in Demark, inside the Muslim milieu as well as (maybe especially) outside. When we explored this theme further,S onja began to talk about her familya nd about the resistance she had met in her familyd uring the laste ight years. Sonja, likes everal other femalec onverts, told us about episodes in her family, at familyd inners, etc., wherer elativesh ad reacted quite strongly to her conversion to Islam.W hen faced with reactions like these,the femalec onverts oftenf eel that their identity and 'belonging' is beingchallenged, that they do not belong anywhere -neither in their families, nor in Denmark. In this regard, Sonjas aid:
Some familymembers of mine do not likeMuslims,and saydisgusting things about them. That makes me sad. Because Ia ma lso Muslim, Ia mj ust like 'them',b ecause Ih avet he same understanding of Islam as 'they' have.I na ddition, it is obvious that there is ad ivision between me and the others in my family, because they do not likeIslam. They do not know how to deal with the situation, whatt os ay to me. (Sonja, age2 3, female convert to Islam) Even though Sonja does find it unfair thatsome family members and others outside her familytreat her differently -or badly -because she is aMuslim, she has accepted that being aM uslim in Denmark can be challenging.L ikewise, Sonja has accepted that being aMuslim includes an ongoing negotiation about identity and belonging. However,b asically,S onjad oes not consider Islam and Muslims to be ethnicallymarked, meaningthat she basically does not consider herself as part of an ethnic minority -just aDanish Muslim. Though, due to the anti-Islamic atmosphere in Denmark in general, and specificallyw ithin certain circles in her own family, Sonja feels that she has been forced to take as tance in this regard. Therefore, for the most part,Sonja feels like an outsider,asone of 'them'-that is, as belongingt ot he Muslim minorityi nD enmark.
Like Sonja, all femaleconverts saythat they consider themselvesasbelonging to the Muslim minorityinDenmark. But unlike Sonja, not all consider this an 'unwanted necessity',but rather something they have chosen as part of the packageo fb eing Muslim in Denmark. This is especiallyt he point of view of recent femalec onverts such as Kirstine and Louise, who converted six months and one year before the interview respectively.T heser ecent women converts are also the most eager to 'fight' or try to counterbalance the hostile atmosphere towards Islam and Muslims in Denmark (see more below). Contrary to Louise and Kirstine,both Sonja, 20-year-old Kathrine and 29-year-old Maria, who converted three and five years before the interview respectively can be said to have largely givenupthis 'fight',ora tl east to have grown tired of trying to counter negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslims. The same goes for the Muslims from ethnic minorityb ackgrounds we interviewed duringt his study.
VisibleM uslims: Part 2
Twenty-three-year-old Omar from Copenhagen is al ivelyI slamic debater,w ho often participatesi np ublic discussions and debates about issues related to Islam and Muslims. During our interview with Omar we botha sked him why he spends so much time debating these issues, and how the often negative atmosphere towards Muslims in Denmarka ffects him in anyw ay.T ot his,h ea nswered: Similarly,29-year-old Hadyia told us that she,due to this 'in-betweenness' straddling aD anish, ethnicallyf oreign, and Muslim identity,h ad spent her entire teenage years figuring out who she is and wheres he belongs. Todays he has come to peace with her dual identity,e vent hough she is aware thatt his dual identity might not be accepted in society generally.
Due to the Danish media and her visibility as aMuslim, Hadyia is very keen on keepingsome of her Islamic values -those thatshe knows are at risk of being labelled 'radical'-to herself, e. g. her views on the Islamic veil, halalmeat,homosexuality,etc. As such, she expects that she never willb ea ble to fullyblend her two identities.
Self-Presentation: Islama s' Project Identity'
Even though the Muslims from ethnicminority backgrounds and the femaleconverts experience tensions in relations to their dual identity,due to theirvisibility as Muslims, their religion is at the same time both one of their most prominent identity markers and am eanst hrough which they can articulate their identity, feminist standpoints, and political values; in short, Islam presents as a 'project identity' in Castells ' (1996) sense, meaning it is as ourceo fc ritique of existing societal arrangements, pointingt oa na lternative social order.Our first example in this regardi s1 9-year-old Amman from Copenhagen.
Amman was born and raised in Copenhagen. His parents are from Palestine, but have livedinDenmark for the past 26 years. We met Amman at asmall Mosque in Copenhagen, wherehespends much of his free time, studying Islamic law and literature. One theme that Amman particularlyfocused upon during the interview was the wayinwhich manyjournalists, politicians, and ordinary people see terrorism and Islam/Muslims as synonymous. ForAmman, as well as for 29-year-old Adil, it is important to try to counterbalance this tendency.Therefore, Amman has decided to grow al ongb eard. By letting his beard grow,A mman wants to show the Danishp eople that the fundamentalist branches of Islam do not have am onopolyo nt he long beard, quitet he contrary -young,well-integrated Muslims can also wear al ong beard:
Just because the Wahabi branch of Islam have longb eards, that does not mean that they have am onopolyo nt he beard … or that I, for that reason, have to shave off the beard. On the contrary,Ihave the beard to show that they do not have monopolyo ns pecific Islamic values. (Amman, ethnic Muslim, 19 years old) Like Amman, Adil is also very conscious about his physical appearance.A dil wears an Islamic robe and at urban every day. This was ac onscious decision he made some years ago -thatheisadevout Muslim, who will not hide his religion to appease the public. Thus, Amman and Adil seem to handle tensions about theirr eligion in the samem anner: They try to disrupt the stereotypical connection between displays of Islamic orthodoxy and asense of threat by showing that devout Muslims, who wear Islamic clothes or grow long beards,can be, and should be seen as,g ood citizens.
In different ways,s everal femalec onverts use similar strategies.F or example, in the previous section, we sawt hatS onja called herself a 'Danish-Muslim closet feminist'.Also, the views expressed by Louise, Kristine, and Maria suggest that they can appropriatelyb el abelled 'Danish-Muslim feminists',e vent hough they do not use thatw ordt od escribet hemselves. However,t hrough what they say, what they do, the makeup they put on, the colourful headscarves and garments they wear,the pictures and statements they post on Instagrama nd Facebook, etc., they all try to express both who they are and what they believein, and in particularthatitispossibletobeb oth aMuslim and what they see as afree, modern, woman at the samet ime.
During our six interviews with female converts, all six talked about the hijab/veil, and oppression and freedom. Contrary to popular opinion, our respondentsm aintain that wearing the hijab or veil is not the samea sb eing op-pressed, quite the opposite. Forexample, accordingtoMaria, she was oftentreated as a 'sexual object' before she took on the hijab. Today, wearingt he hijab, Maria feels relaxed and free. This was also something Louise talked about. Like Maria, Louise also felt thate speciallyy oung males often used to treat her as an 'object',priorthe taking on the hijab. Today, that is not the case anymore. In addition to this -and to some degreedue to it -Louise also considers herself more special and feminine todayt han priort oc onversion and especiallyb efore taking on the veil; as well as making her feel special (in the sense of positively distinctive -noticed, in ag ood way -but also better respected), wearingt he hijab has also made Louise more conscious about her appearance in public.
When we met Louise, she had been wearingt he hijab for two months. We thereforeasked her whether this visibility had changed her identity and/or public appearancesi na ny way. This she confirmed:
AfterIbegan to wearthe veil and Isit on atrain … Ican put some Arabic music on, on my headphones, and then turn the volume up, so that people around me can hear it.Ido not know why, but Ij ust want people to see that it is OK -nothingb ad will happen, just because Ia mM uslim. Moreover,i fIgreet someone on the train, when Ig et in or on my way out,t hen Ig reet them in Arabic. Ip robablyj ust have an eed to say, that it is OK to be a Muslim, that it is not dangerous. Ijust want to tell the positive storyabout Islam in public. (Louise, 24 years old, convert) And lastly, besides making her feel more distinctive as awoman and as responsible for counterbalancingstereotypes about Muslims, the hijab has also become af ashion item for Louise, and, again, at ool through which she can show the public that she is still a 'normal' woman with normal interests -e. g. fashion: The last example we will discuss is 18-year-old Kirstine.K irstine is av ery energetic young woman, with af ast and sharp mind and tongue. She is politically volunteering,a ctive on several boards at school, in her neighbourhood, etc. Like several other women converts, she has faced strongr esistancef rom within her own family.Thus, to show both her parents and surroundingsingeneral that she is still the 'same, good old Kirstine' regardless of religion, she is still doing volunteer work at the Christian congregation wheres he formerlyw as am ember and her parents still are members. In addition, she alsohas afeeling that people often consider her to be a 'dumb' or suppressed, youngwoman now thatshe has become aMuslim -or as if 'the veil had shot down my intelligence'.This annoys Kirstine,asshe is an elite student at her school and in general is very devoted to her studies and to gettingahigher university degreea fter highs chool. She considers herself to be a 'normal' young girl, and she uses Instagramtoshow that to her followers.S everal timese very dayK irstine posts pictureso fh erself wearing the hijab, red lipstick, and heavy makeup around her eyes. Sometimess he lets the 'picturesdoall the talking',and sometimes she writes ashort text to the pictures,a bout her being ay oung,m odern, and free woman -certainlyn ot ar epressed or foolishw oman.
Danish Muslimsi nC omparative Context
The impact of negative media framing seems to be dependent on the interviewees' visibility as Muslims, with those who are more visible (whether by dress or ethnicity)e xperiencing it more stronglya nd relentlessly. It is experienceda s frustrating and tiring,w ith tiredness shown not onlyi nr eported feelings, but in at endencya mongst converts graduallyt ob ecome less active in attempts to pro-actively combat negative stereotypes. However,the very visibilitythatresults in asense of being permanentlyunder scrutinycan alsobemobilizedaspart of a strategytocombat stereotyping, both amongst ethnic minority males and female converts, by combiningt he adoption of markedlyM uslim styles of dress and groomingwith behaving in exemplary ways,both by ethnic Danisha nd Muslim standards.F or women, this includes combiningh ijab with makeup, using fashionable styles,a nd excelling in studies; for ment his maym ean being scrupulouslypolite and considerate. Thus both genders use strategies to subvert stereotypes which link Islamic dress to insularitya nd radicalism( for men) or submissiveness and stupidity (for women).
Our interviewees weren ot keyo rganizers of online 'counter-publics' (see Chapter 9), but all belonged to and to differinge xtents werea ctive in such groups (e. g. for hijab fashion), and drew social and emotional support from them. This support,a sw ella sm osque attendance, the example of the Prophet, prayer and private study,h elpedt hem to copew ith the psychological strain of 'living in the spotlight'.
Finally, we compareour findingswith that of astudy conducted partlyonthe far sideofthe Øresund Bridge,inMalmö, Sweden, which mayshedsome light on whythe formation of dual (Danish and Muslim) and multiple (e. g. DanishT urk-ish Muslim) identities are provings oh ard to achieve, and on the conditions which might more readilye nable their formation. It maya lso illuminatet he interplayo fm edia with other factors shapingb oth identityf ormation and the integration of contemporary European societies. Scuzzarello (2015) compared participation in elections and the formation of dual identification amongst Somalis and Poles in Ealing,W est London and Malmö, Sweden, municipalities of similar size (between 310,000 and 340,000, and with highp roportions of foreign-born population; 31 percent in Malmö and 57 percent in Ealing;ibid., 1221). We shallfocus on the Somalis, who, as Muslims, are the most relevant comparison group for our sample. Somalis, in both municipalities, have low economic activity rates (20p ercent employment), and tend to be portrayedaspoorlyintegratedinnational media. While voter registration and access to polling was easieri nM almö than Ealing, Scuzzarello found that 'Somali participantsi nM almö tend to vote to al esser degree thant hose in Ealing' (ibid., 1224). She concludes thatt his was because Somalis in Ealing weremore readilyable to form multiple identifications, because Muslim, Somali, and British identitiesw eree xperienced as compatible, and this in turn made them feel entitled and motivated to vote (ibid., 1228). In contrast in Malmö, Somalis felt they were still viewed as immigrants and not accepted as Swedish: 'Somalis' identification with the superordinate group (i. e. Sweden) has not been sociallyv alidated by the majority society.' (ibid., 1229). than one imposed by aliberal welfarestate (Sweden). Furthermore, in more historicallyh omogeneouss ocieties, it mayb em ored ifficult to prevent the formation of the binary us/them, immigrant/native distinction which works against the formation of multiple identities.
Conclusion
Returning to Denmark, here we find ac ombination of UK level negativity towards Muslim immigrants (46 percent in botht he UK and Denmark support the statements 'allow few' or 'allow no' Muslim immigrants compared with 19 percent in Sweden, ESS 2014), with ah istory of Lutheran hegemonya nd homogeneity,but less mitigated by government-led attempts to introduce institutional multiculturalism than in Sweden. Hence the challenges facing ethnic and new Muslims witnessed in this chapter.Inrelation to furthering understandingofmediatizationi nacomparative context,o ur findingss uggest that while media are powerful structuring forces, other factors alsoshape national dynamics, e. g. government support for institutional multiculturalism,the historical legacies of Lutheranism (Scandinavia) and Empire (UK), and the influenceo fc ivil society-led anti-racist struggles, as seen here. This suggests thattoproperlyu nderstand the dynamics of mediatization in specific cases, media dynamics need to be rigorouslyc ontextualizedb yb roader processes of historical and social change, and are best viewed comparatively.
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